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Locating lawful abortion on the spectrum of ³pURSHUPHGLFDOWUHDWPHQW´ 
 Mary Neal 
 
Introduction 
As every undergraduate medical law student knows, when a patient is capable of giving her 
consent, the least touching without consent may amount to a tort and a crime.1  But, as Lord 
Mustill remarked in R v Brown,2 more invasive medical treatments (those intrusions which 
outwith the medical context might amount to assaults causing actual or grievous bodily harm, 
or maim) may be µwell above any point at which consent could even arguably be regarded as 
IXUQLVKLQJDGHIHQFH¶.3  According to his Lordship, where such treatments are concerned, it is 
not the existence of consent, but the fact that the intervention counts as proper medical 
treatment, which prevents criminal liability from attaching to those treatments.  In these more 
invasive cases, as Margot Brazier and Sara Fovargue suggest, proper medical treatment 
works µmagic¶4 DQGµWUDQVIRUP[s] something wrong into something right¶.5 
 Where abortion is concerned, the concept of proper medical treatment never works to 
transform wrongs into rights; that magic is worked instead by the Abortion Act 1967 (as 
amended by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990).  The practice of abortion, 
otherwise a statutory crime in England and Wales under sections 58 and 59 of the Offences 
Against the Person Act 1861 (and a common law crime in Scotland), is transformed, provided 
that certain conditions are met, into lawful medical treatment by section 1 of the 1967 Act as 
amended. Why consider the concept of proper medical treatment in this context at all, then?  I 
suggest that there are at least two reasons to regard the concept as being relevant to abortion 
                                                          
1
 See, e.g., Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] 1 All ER 643, HL per Lord 
Scarman. 
2
 [1994] 1 AC 212, HL. 
3
 Brown (n 2) 266. 
4
 M Brazier, S Fovargue µ7UDQVIRUPLQJ ZURQJ LQWR ULJKW :KDW LV ³SURSHU PHGLFDO WUHDWPHQW´"¶ in this 
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law, notwithstanding that the current lawfulness of abortion is not attributable to it. The first 
is that the concept of proper medical treatment is wider than just the medical exception. 
Whether an intrusion is minor enough that consent alone can render it non-criminal (as is the 
case with superficial examinations and treatments involving only minor touchings of the 
body), or is sufficiently severe to require the ³magic´ power of the medical exception, the 
idea of proper medical treatment is busy in the background. It defines the nature and contours 
of the practitioner-patient relationship, and sketches out the landscape of healthcare law. 
 The second reason why we need to be clear about whether, and to what extent, the 
practice of abortion conforms to the notion of proper medical treatment is that although the 
lawfulness of abortion does not currently depend upon such conformity, an emerging strand 
of pro-choice activism is focused on the demand that abortion be completely decriminalised.6  
It is unclear at the time of writing precisely how the fulfilment of that demand would be 
cashed out in terms of detailed law reform, but it is likely that the legislative apparatus that 
currently marks out the (admittedly somewhat byzantine) boundary between lawful and 
unlawful abortion would need to be repealed or amended, at least in part. Depending on how 
and to what extent the current legislative framework is disturbed, surgical abortion, like other 
invasive treatments, may come to depend for its lawfulness upon the transformative power of 
proper medical treatment. Medical abortion, as a less invasive form of treatment, may remain 
within the category of treatments for which consent alone is enough to remove criminality; if 
so, proper medical treatment would retain the same kind of background role in relation to 
medical abortion, post-decriminalisation, that (I will argue) it currently has in relation to all 
cases of abortion. 
 
                                                          
6
 See, e.g. µ)RXUJRRG UHDVRQV IRU%ULWDLQ WRGHFULPLQDOLVH DERUWLRQ DOWRJHWKHU¶ BPAS Reproductive Review: 
Issues in Abortion, Pregnancy, and Birth (12 June 2014) 
<http://www.reproductivereview.org/index.php/rr/article/1592/> (accessed  1 December 2014); S Sheldon, 
µ:K\:H6KRXOG7DNH$ERUWLRQRXWRIWKH&ULPLQDO/DZ¶, Centre for Law and Society seminar, University of 
Edinburgh, 6 November 2014. 
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Understanding proper medical treatment 
In their chapter, Brazier and Fovargue subject the concept of proper medical treatment to 
forensic analysis, exploring each of its component parts in order to build  up a picture of what 
counts as proper medical treatment and why.  7KH\EHJLQE\QRWLQJZKDWDSSHDUWREHµWZR
HOHPHQWVWRWKHPHGLFDOH[FHSWLRQ¶RYHUDQGDERYHWKHSUHVHQFHRIFRQVHQWZKHUHFRQVHQWLV
possible), nameO\ µWKH UHDVRQDEOHQHVV RI WKH DFWLYLW\ XQGHU FRQVLGHUDWLRQ¶ DQG WKH IDFW WKDW
µWKDW DFWLYLW\ LV LQ WKH SXEOLF LQWHUHVW.¶7 Of these two, reasonableness seems to have a 
particularly fundamental role: µ>W@KH reason for the treatment («) appears central to the 
PHGLFDO H[FHSWLRQ¶8 In highlighting reasonableness, Brazier and Fovargue join a tradition 
which was, arguably, begun by Denning LJ in Bravery v Bravery9 when he implied that 
RSHUDWLRQVPXVWEHFDUULHGRXWZLWKµMXVWFDXVHRUH[FXVH¶10 and continued by Lord Lane CJ 
in Attorney-*HQHUDO¶V 5HIHUHQFH 1R  RI ,11 who referred to the undesirability of 
ERGLO\KDUPµIRUQRJRRGUHDVRQ.¶12 From the initial insight that proper medical treatment is 
somehow connected with reasonableness of purpose, Brazier and Fovargue embark upon a 
detailed inquiry into the various factors that seem capable either of rendering a practice 
µSURSHU¶LQWKHPVHOYHVRUDWOHDVWRIFRQWULEXWLQJWRDGHWHUPLQDWLRQRISURSHUQHVV)URPWKHLU
analysis, several factors seem to emerge as having justificatory potential, notably that the 
activity is beneficial to (or has the potential to benefit) the patient,13 that the activity is in the 
SXEOLF LQWHUHVW RU µSXEOLFJRRG¶,14 that the activity is in accordance with the norms of the 
healthcare profession(s),15 DQG WKDW LW LV SHUIRUPHG E\ µWUXVWHG¶ KHDOWKFDUH SURIHVVLRQDOV16  
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7KH LGHD RI ³UHDVRQDEOHQHVV´ VHHPV LPPDQHQW LQ DOO RI WKHVH so that it has the air of an 
overarching or background element in the process of justification. 
 To a significant exWHQW%UD]LHUDQG)RYDUJXH¶VDQDO\VLVUHIOHFWVDOWKRXJKLWGRHVQRW
replicate) Penney /HZLV¶V HYDOXDWLRQ RI WKH PHGLFDO H[FHSWLRQ LQ KHU VHPLQDO SDSHU.17 The 
IDFWRUV WKH\ LGHQWLI\ DV UHOHYDQW WR DVVHVVPHQWV RI SURSHUQHVV ODUJHO\ PDS RQ WR /HZLV¶V
discussion of public policy justifications. Lewis argues that the medical exception operates 
only where two conditions are met: consent (where that is possible), and the existence of a 
public policy justification. 6KHGLVWLQJXLVKHVEHWZHHQµSDWLHQW-IRFXVHG¶µSXEOLc-IRFXVHG¶DQG
µSURIHVVLRQDOO\ IRFXVHG¶ SXEOLF SROLF\ MXVWLILFDWLRQV18 and the main factors identified by 
Brazier and Fovargue seem broadly to mirror these categories.19 
 Since Lewis is concerned with the line between criminality and non-criminality, it is 
unsurprising that her discussion focuses exclusively on tracing that boundary. Brazier and 
)RYDUJXH¶VH[DPLQDWLRQRISURSHUWUHDWPHQWOLNHZLVHFRQFHQWUDWHVRQZKDWPLJKWEHUHTXLUHG
over and above consent, in order to prevent actions from attracting criminal liability. They 
focus on the medical exception and do not explicitly distinguish this from proper medical 
treatment; nevertheless, the two terms are not synonymous. Whereas the medical exception 
has a limited role insofar as it applies only to those interventions which are intrusive enough 
to amount to serious offences against the person, the concept of proper medical treatment as 
described by Brazier and Fovargue encompasses all lawful medical treatment, and not only 
those treatments which involve the kind of significant intrusions authorised by the medical 
exception. The medical exception performs a specific function (the exclusion of criminal 
liability) and, in so doing, it ushers new and controversial practices into the fold of proper 
medical treatment. Thus, we begin to build a picture of the relationship between the two 
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 P /HZLVµ7KH0HGLFDO([FHSWLRQ¶Current Legal Problems 355-376. 
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  Lewis (n 17) 357-364. 
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ideas, in which the medical exception appears to serve to police and extend the boundaries of 
the wider and more general category of proper medical treatment. 
 
The spectrum of proper medical treatment: paradigm, clear and liminal 
If one feature of the existing literature is that it has not yet begun to tease out the distinction 
between the medical exception on the one hand and the wider concept of proper medical 
treatment on the other, another is that little attention seems to have been paid so far to 
gradations of properness within the landscape of the lawful.  Because so much attention has 
been trained on the medical exception, it is the line between the lawful and the unlawful 
which has drawn the academic eye. But further distinctions are possible. In the context of a 
recent discussion of conscience rights,20 Sara Fovargue and I have argued that within the 
FDWHJRU\ RI µSURSHU PHGLFDO WUHDWPHQW¶ D JLYHQ WUHDWPHQW FDQ EH HLWKHU µclearly proper¶ or 
µliminally proper¶: 
 
$ WUHDWPHQWPD\RFFXS\ OLPLQDO VWDWXVEHFDXVH GHVSLWHEHLQJ ODZIXO LW LV µPRUDOO\
FRQWURYHUVLDO DQG FRQWHQWLRXV¶  3UDFWLFHV ZKLFK LQYROYH WKH HQGLQJ RI KXPDQ OLIH
such as abortion, IVF, and withholding or withdrawing treatment from unconscious 
SDWLHQWV RU VHYHUHO\ GLVDEOHG QHZERUQV PD\ EH OLPLQDOO\ µSURSHU¶ IRU WKLV UHDVRQ
assisted dying will be too, if it becomes lawful to provide it within the healthcare 
context («) A treatment may also have liminal status if it is extremely risky or 
experimental, or if it is more concerned with the satisfaction of preferences than with 
healing or treating disease.21 
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 S Fovargue, M Neal, µ³,Q good cRQVFLHQFH´ &RQVFLHQFH-based exemptions and proper medical tUHDWPHQW¶
(2015) 23 Medical Law Review (forthcoming). 
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 Fovargue and Neal (n 20). 
6 
 
We distinguished between clear and liminal cases of proper medical treatment in order to 
identify liminal treatment as the zone within which conscience-based exemptions can be 
appropriate. The existence of a conscience clause may be a clue that the status of the 
treatment in question is liminal; hence, the existence of conscience-based exemptions in 
relation to (non-emergency) abortion22 and the activities governed by the Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Act 1990,23 and the conscience clauses in Bills aimed at decriminalising 
assisted suicide.24  Indeed, the existence of a permitting statute (whether or not it contains a 
conscience clause) may be a clue in itself, since the need for clear statutory authority may 
indicate that a practice exists at the margins of what could otherwise be DFFHSWHGDV³SURSHU´.  
Practices currently permitted by statute include living organ donation,25 abortion, and embryo 
research, and the legalisation of assisted suicide seems also to be regarded as a matter for the 
legislature.26 
 The distinction between clear and liminal proper treatment is, in a sense, the subject-
matter of the present volume, and many of the chapters herein can be read as mapping out 
areas of liminality within the category of proper medical treatment, as much as charting the 
border between the proper and the improper.27 In the passage quoted above, Fovargue and I 
focused on specific contexts and examples where treatments might be regarded as liminal as a 
(non-exhaustive) way of describing the realm of liminality. But another approach to 
                                                          
22
 Section 4(1) of thH$ERUWLRQ$FWSURYLGHVWKDWµQRSHUVRQVKDOOEHXQGHUDQ\GXW\ZKHWKHUE\FRQWUDFW
or by any statutory or other legal requirement, to participate in any treatment authorised by this Act to which he 
KDVDFRQVFLHQWLRXVREMHFWLRQ¶ 
23
 Section 38(1) of WKH$FWSURYLGHVWKDWµ1RSHUVRQZKRKDVDFRQVFLHQWLRXVREMHFWLRQWRSDUWLFLSDWLQJLQ
DQ\DFWLYLW\JRYHUQHGE\WKLV$FWVKDOOEHXQGHUDQ\GXW\KRZHYHUDULVLQJWRGRVR¶ 
24
 Provision for conscience was included in the various Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bills tabled by 
/RUG-RIIHDQGWKHUHLVDFRQVFLHQFHFODXVHLQWKH$VVLVWHG'\LQJ%LOOWKHµ)DOFRQHU%LOO¶FXUUHQWO\EHIRUHWKH
House of Lords.  The version of the Assisted Suicide (Scotland) Bill currently before the Scottish Parliament 
does not include a conscience provision because although health (including assisted dying) is devolved, 
regulation of the professions is reserved to Westminster. 
25
 Under the Human Tissue Act 2004 and the Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006. 
26
 R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice [2014] UKSC 38. 
27






describing the distinction between clearly and liminally proper treatments might be to 
identify what the features of a ³paradigm case´ of proper medical treatment are, and to regard 
a treatment as ³proper´ in a stronger or weaker sense depending on how closely it models that 
paradigm. 
 In Bravery Denning /-GHVFULEHGµRUGLQDU\¶VXUJHU\DVEHLQJµGRQH for the sake of a 
PDQ¶V KHDOWK ZLWK KLV FRQVHQW.¶28  Borrowing this formulation and adapting it slightly, I 
propose that we regard the paradigm case of proSHUPHGLFDO WUHDWPHQWDVEHLQJ³treatment 
carried out with the consent of the patient and for the paWLHQW¶VWKHUDSHXWLFEHQHILW´The first 
element of this formulation, consent, is indicated by the centrality of the principle of 
autonomy in contemporary healthcare law and the resulting requirement that where consent is 
possible, it must be obtained on pain of criminal and civil sanction.  The second element, 
therapeutic benefit,29 is indicated by the widespread perception that one of the central 
purposes of healthcare is to provide health-related benefit to patients (only a minority of 
practices permitted in the healthcare context have no potential therapeutic benefit for the 
patient), and the resulting mainstream characterisation of the relationship between the 
healthcare professional and patient as a therapeutic relationship.  The British Medical 
Association characterises the doctor-patient relationship as a µWKHUDSHXWLF relationship¶30 and 
the encounter between doctor and patient as a µWKHUDSHXWLF encounter¶31  It contrasts the 
µXVXDOPRGHORIDWKHUDSHXWLFSDUWQHUVKLS¶32 DQGWKHµQRUPDOWKHUDSHXWLFUROH¶33 of the doctor 
with other situations where doctors act in a dual capacity (doctors who work in prisons, for 
example, have duties to their employers as well as to their patients), or where there is no 
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 Bravery (n 9) 1180. 
29
 I adopt WKH SKUDVH ³WKHUDSHXWLF EHQHILW´ from Brazier and Fovargue because it reflects the idea of a 
³WKHUDSHXWLFUHODWLRQVKLS´Dnd captures the sense in which ³benefit´ in the context of healthcare law and ethics 
goes wider than narrow clinical benefit, but not so wide as to encompass the mere satisfaction oI SDWLHQWV¶
personal preferences. 
30
 BMA Medical Ethics Today: The BMA's Handbook of Ethics and Law (Wiley, 2012), 27, 208, 702. 
31
 BMA (n 30) 6. 
32
 BMA (n 30) 649. 
33
 BMA (n 30) 690. 
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therapeutic aspect to the relationship at all (where a doctor completes a report for an 
insurance company as an independent assessor, for example).34 
 Space does QRWSHUPLWDGLVFXVVLRQRIWKH³HQGVRIPHGLFLQHGHEDWH´KHUHH[FHSWWR
note that while there is disagreement among scholars regarding what the proper ends of 
medicine are, plausible suggestions invariably seem to cite beneficence/best interests.35 This 
is clearly so where the physician patient relationship is regarded, in the traditional way, 
H[SOLFLWO\ DV D µKHDOLQJ UHODWLRQVKLS¶36 However, a set of revised goals identified by an 
international panel of experts which set out specifically to challenge traditional views of the 
goals of medicine and identify new goals more reflective of the realities of modern medicine 
seems to rely just as heavily on notions of beneficence/best interests.37 7KH³QHZ´ goals are 
(i) the prevention of disease and injury and promotion and maintenance of health, (ii) the 
relief of pain and suffering caused by maladies, (iii) the care and cure of those with a malady, 
and the care of those who cannot be cured, and (iv) the avoidance of premature death and the 
pursuit of a peaceful death.38 Each of these seems obviously to be focused on producing 
benefit for patients. While Mark Wicclair regards the traditional claim that medicine is 
RULHQWHGWRZDUGµKHDOLQJ¶DVRYHUO\-essentialist, he concludes nevertheless WKDWµLWLVSODXVLEOH
to maintain that healing is associated with the concept of medicine (or any credible 
conception of it), and it is arguable that an individual who is not committed to that end fails 
to qualify as a physician, let alone a virtuous one¶.39  
 Clearly, there are healthcare interventions which do not model the paradigm case 
outlined above, but which are, nevertheless, well-accepted.  Treatment without consent is 
                                                          
34
 BMA (n 30) 27-28. 
35
 See also L Frithµ:KDWGRZHPHDQE\³SURSHU´PHGLFDO WUHDWPHQW"¶LQWKLVFROOHFWLRQ 
36
 ED Pellegrino, µ7RZDUGD5HFRQVWUXFWLRQRI0HGLFDO0RUDOLW\¶ The American Journal of Bioethics 
651, 67. 
37
 An International Project of the Hastings Center, µ7KH JRDOVRI PHGLFLQH6HWWLQJ QHZ SULRULWLHV¶  
Hastings Center Report S1. 
38
 +DVWLQJV&HQWHUµ6SHFLI\LQJWKHJRDOVRIPHGLFLQH¶(n 37) S10-S14. 
39
 M :LFFODLUµ,VFRQVFLHQWLRXVREMHFWLRQLQFRPSDWLEOHZLWKDSK\VLFLDQ¶VSURIHVVLRQDOREOLJDWLRQV"¶
Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 171, 174. 
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possible where a patient lacks the capacity to consent, either temporarily (in which case any 
proposed intervention must be justified on grounds of necessity) or permanently (in which 
case any proposed intervention PXVWVDWLVI\D³EHVWLQWHUHVWV´ test).  However, I suggest that 
the paradigm case of proper treatment is one where consent is present; the justification for 
intervention in other cases, although still patient-FHQWUHG WDNHV DQ ³alternatLYH´ form. The 
³WKHUDSHXWLFEHQHILW´ element can also be absent in certain cases without this meaning that the 
intervention is impermissible. Cases of living organ donation are an example. The bodily 
intrusion involved in retrieving an organ from a living donor is significant, and it is not 
performed for the direct therapeutic benefit of the patient being intruded upon. Arguably, the 
retrieval of the organ provides a psychological or emotional benefit for the donor; this 
argument is perhaps strongest where the recipient of the organ is a loved one of the donor, but 
may also be present where the donation is impersonally altruistic. Usually, however, the 
permissibility of such interventLRQVLVGLVFXVVHGLQWHUPVRI³SXEOLFLQWHUHVW´RU³SXEOLFJRRG´ 
justifications, perhaps implying that the benefit to the donor is regarded as being too weak, or 
too indirect, to provide a convincing justification in itself. That the permissibility of living 
organ donation is established by statute in the UK PD\KLQWDWWKHµH[FHSWLRQDO¶QDWXUHRIWKLV
kind of intervention. The need for a statute to put its lawfulness beyond doubt is surely 
connected to the lack of a therapeutic benefit to the donor and could be regarded as implying 
that, in the absence of clear statutory authorisation, the lack of such a benefit would render 
the practice questionable, and locate it at (or possibly beyond) the periphery of proper 
medical treatment. 
 The two key elements of the paradigm case, consent and therapeutic benefit, have 
different roles in determining the properness of treatment. &RQVHQW RSHUDWHV LQ DQ ³all or 
QRWKLQJ´ way. If it is possible, it must be present, and if it is present and the intervention is 
also clearly therapeutic, what we have is a paradigm case of proper medical treatment. If the 
10 
 
capacity to consent is absent, then providing that the relevant patient-centred test is met 
(necessity or best interests, GHSHQGLQJ RQ WKH SDWLHQW¶V FRQGLWLRQ DQG SURYLGLQJ WKDW WKH
intervention is clearly therapeutic, the absence of consent does not preclude proper medical 
treatment. Although we are not dealing in such circumstances with a paradigm case, the 
properness of the treatment is not in doubt. This is because treatment in cases where patients 
cannot consent is both necessary and desirable, and also because the portion of the overall 
justification which consent represents in the paradigm case can be satisfied by necessity or 
best interests in other cases. Therapeutic treatment without consent which is justified by 
necessity in the case of an unconscious patient, or in the best interests of a patient who lacks 
capacity on a longer term basis, is thus ³FOHDUO\´SURSHU albeit not paradigmatic. 
 If consent is possible, but is not obtained, then any intervention on the patient is 
improper. The absence of consent cannot, therefore, be what locates an intervention within 
the liminal zone of proper medical treatment. If consent is absent because of the patient lacks 
capacity, then providing that the appropriate alternative mechanism for justification is 
satisfied, treatment (if clearly therapeutic) is clearly proper. On the other hand, if consent is 
absent because the consent of a patient with capacity has not been given for a particular 
intervention, this is not liminal but improper. Liminal proper medical treatment is still lawful, 
and, indeed, still proper. It occurs at the margins or peripheries of what is proper. By contrast, 
any treatment of a patient with capacity without her consent stands completely outside of the 
realm of what is proper. As such, the consent element of the paradigm can never be the basis 
for a determination of liminality. 
 What could SRLQW WR µOLPLQDOO\ SURSHU WUHDWPHQW¶ WKHQ" Determinations regarding 
whether an intervention is clearly or only liminally proper will focus on the therapeutic value 
or potential of the intervention (the second element of the paradigm case). If it can be shown 
(or if a strong consensus emerges) that a whole practice, or a particular intervention, is 
11 
 
positively harmful ± either exclusively harmful or so harmful that any supposed 
countervailing benefit(s) cannot render it therapeutic on balance ± then whether it is liminally 
proper or improper will depend on the circumstances. 1RWZLWKVWDQGLQJ WKH SUDFWLWLRQHU¶V
HWKLFDOGXW\WRµGRQRKDUP¶QRQ-maleficence), living organ donation, which represents a net 
harm to the donor, can be lawful. For a harmful intervention to be liminally proper, consent 
must be present, and so must a strong public interest justification. Statutory authorisation may 
also be necessary, as discussed above, and it is present in the case of living organ donation. 
Even with all of this in place, I suggest that a harmful intervention can only ever be liminally 
proper at best (never clearly or paradigmatically proper). Harmful interventions where 
consent and/or public interest are absent cannot even be liminally proper. Whole practices 
that fall into this category might include female genital mutilation, extreme or multiple 
cosmetic procedures, and (perhaps less clearly) the amputation of healthy limbs as treatment 
for body integrity disorder. Individual interventions that belong in this category might include 
burdensome interventions upon dying patients: the resuscitation of a patient who is terminally 
ill and close to death, for example, or the aggressive treatment of an infection in a dying 
patient with antibiotics which cause unpleasant side effects. Insofar as such interventions 
cause suffering which is not outweighed by any meaningful gain in comfort or enhanced life 
expectancy, they too may be outside the boundaries of proper treatment.   
 In other cases therapeutic benefit is speculative or uncertain, but the intention in 
providing the treatment is clearly to try to benefit the patient. The provision of a risky or 
experimental new cancer treatment might be one example. Alternatively, although therapeutic 
potential for the patient is be absent, there may be an overwhelming public interest in 
permitting the practice which may be sufficient to compensate for the absence of the 
therapeutic element. Penney Lewis discusses what she terms µQHZRUFRQWUoversial medical 
SURFHGXUHV¶, VXFK DV µFRVPHWLF VXUJHU\ FLUFXPFLVLRQ DQG JHQLWDO PXWLODWLRQ FRQWUDFHSWLYH
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sterilization; organ donation; non-therapeutic research; gender reassignment surgery; and 
amputation for body integrity disorder¶.40 These practices exist at the boundaries of proper 
medical treatment, and Lewis has explored how the medical exception might operate to bring 
them within it. My claim here is that the potential for recognising them as proper will depend 
on the extent to which either the therapeutic element can be made out, or its absence can be 
compensated by overwhelming public interest. 
 Much more could be said about all of this, and, in particular, about which categories 
particular practices and interventions belong in. Is living organ donation ³SRVLWLYHO\KDUPIXO´
WR WKH GRQRU RU MXVW ³QRW WKHUDSHXWLF´, for example? Different commentators will come to 
different conclusions about this and similar questions, but I want to sidestep such questions 
for the moment, since it is not necessary for present purposes to resolve the content of each of 
the categories which is entailed by my analysis so far. It will be necessary, however, before I 
can proceed to apply that analysis in the content of abortion, to summarise my argument and 
to sketch the (necessarily basic) typology of proper medical treatment that emerges from it. 
 
A basic typology of proper medical treatment 
The essence of my argument so far has been threefold. First, proper medical treatment is 
wider than the medical exception. Second, as Sara Fovargue and I have argued elsewhere, 
within the category of proper medical treatment we can distinguish between µSDUDGLJP¶
µclear¶ and µliminal¶ cases of proper treatment. Finally, developing the second point, I want to 
understand proper medical treatment as a spectrum. At one end of this spectrum are paradigm 
cases of proper treatment, treatment (i) where consent is both possible and clearly present, 
and (ii) which has clear therapeutic benefit for the patient being intervened upon. Further 
along WKHVSHFWUXPWKHUHDUHFDVHVZKHUHLQWHUYHQWLRQVµFOHDUO\¶FRQVWLWXWHSURSHUWUHDWPHQW 
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 Lewis (n 17) 355. 
13 
 
because (i) they are justified, not by consent (because consent is impossible), but by some 
other patient-centred test such as necessity or best interests, and (ii) there is clear therapeutic 
benefit to the patients concerned. Further along still, interventions which are consensual may 
be proper notwithstanding that their potential for therapeutic benefit is either contested or 
non-existent, providing either that the intervention is not a clear harm which is not 
outweighed by (potential for) benefit (risky/experimental cancer treatment, for example), or 
that there are public interest considerations which weigh in favour of allowing the 
intervention to take place (if we construe live organ donation as a net harm to the donor, we 
may decide nonetheless, as UK law has done, that it ought to be permitted as a public good). 
This is the liminal zone of proper medical treatment; still proper but less clearly proper than 
the first two categories of treatment. If therapeutic potential is absent or contested, a 
treatment is either liminally proper or even improper, depending on the circumstances; but it 
is liminally proper at best. 
 Perhaps the most controversial category of liminal treatment is treatment where the 
patient lacks capacity and a procedure with no therapeutic value is performed. Infant male 
circumcision might be one example of this. Academic opinion is divided regarding whether 
this practice ought to be permitted; Margot Brazier has taken the view WKDW µ>D@OWKRXJK
medical opinion may not necessarily regard [infant circumcision] as positively beneficial, it is 
in no way medically harmful if properly performed.¶41 Michael Thomson and Marie Fox, on 
the other hand, have critiFLVHG µFRQWLQXHG SURIHVVLRQDO ZLOOLQJQHVV WR WROHUDWH WKH QRQ-
therapeutic, non-consensual excision of healthy tissue.¶42 Another example is the non-
therapeutic sterilisation of a patient who lacks capacity. This is permissible if it is authorised 
by a court; on the other hand, therapeutic sterilisation of a patient without capacity - for 
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 M Brazier, Medicine, Patients and the Law (Penguin, 1992) 350. 
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 M Fox, M 7KRPVRQ µ$FRYHQDQW ZLWK WKH VWDWXVTXR"0DOH FLUFXPFLVLRQ DQG WKH QHZ%0$JXLGDQFH WR
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Journal of Medical Ethics 463. 
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example, to deal with a medical condition such as excessive menstruation or cancer - does not 
require such authorisation.43 
 When we pass the liminal area of the spectrum, we reach the realm of improper 
activity which includes non-consensual treatment of patients with capacity, treatment of 
patients who lack capacity which is not in their best interests, and activity carried out by non-
qualified persons.44   
 The largest category is likely to be that containing paradigm cases of proper medical 
treatment, where consent and therapeutic benefit are both clearly established. The next largest 
category is probably µclearly proper¶ treatment, where therapeutic benefit is not contested, but 
consent is substituted by another patient-centred justification.  The liminal zone of proper 
treatment where therapeutic benefit is absent or contested will be a smaller category, 
IROORZHGE\µLPSURSHUDFWLYLW\¶. As we travel along the spectrum from the paradigm case to 
the improper, therapeutic benefit tends to decrease. The only exception to that general trend is 
WKDWDWWKHµLPSURSHU¶HQGRIWKHVSHFWUXPLQWHUYHQWLRQs will be improper regardless of clear 
therapeutic benefit if they are performed in the absence of a patient-centred justification 
(which must be consent in the case of a patient with capacity). 
 
Abortion and proper medical treatment 
What light, if any, can the foregoing analysis of proper medical treatment shed on the status 
of abortion? I claimed in the introductory section of this chapter that it is useful to consider 
abortion in light of the emerging discussion about proper medical treatment for two reasons.  
First, because pro-choice activists have recently put the decriminalisation of the practice of 
abortion on the political agenda; decriminalisation would be likely to involve the removal of 
any statutory justification for the practice, so that surgical abortion would fall to be justified 
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in the same way as any other intrusive intervention. Second, because the concept of proper 
medical treatment is wider than just the medical exception. It is, I have claimed, a graduated 
concept, so that all treatment can be located somewhere on the spectrum of the proper. The 
issues at stake in lawful abortion have, of course, been considered thoroughly from a range of 
angles, but the lens of proper medical treatment offers yet another perspective from which to 
consider the practice. 
 One key measure in determining where practices ought to be located along the 
spectrum will be their potential therapeutic value; in other words, the extent to which we 
UHJDUGDSUDFWLFHDVFDSDEOHRIVHUYLQJSDWLHQWV¶EHVWLQWHUHVWV, or offering them benefit.  In the 
context of abortion, the state of modern medical scienFH LV VXFK WKDW µ>ODZIXO@ DERUWLRQ LV
almost always safer than («) a full term birth¶.45 One recent US study found that µ>W@KHULVN
RIGHDWKDVVRFLDWHGZLWKFKLOGELUWKLVDSSUR[LPDWHO\WLPHVKLJKHUWKDQWKDWZLWKDERUWLRQ¶, 
DQGWKDWµWKHRYHUDOOPRUELGLWy associated with childbirth exceeds that with abortion¶.46 The 
implication of this is that in almost all cases, performing a safe, lawful abortion prevents a 
greater risk to maternal health, and on this basis it could be argued that where abortion is 
performed non-negligently and lawfully, it is always clearly therapeutic. Providing that clear 
consent is also present, then, on this view all safe and lawful abortion would always fall 
within the paradigm zone of proper medical treatment. Alternatively, recalling the passage 
above in which Fovargue and I discuss the factors that might render a practice liminal, it 
could be concluded that lawful abortion will always fall within the liminal zone of proper 
medical treatment, because it always involves the destruction of human life. Abortion always 
ends the life of an individual human entity, regardless of the reason for performing it. This is 
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 A )XUHGL µ$ERUWLRQ LV VDIH DQG LW VKRXOGEH DV DYDLODEOH DV HDVLO\ DV FRQWUDFHSWLRQ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so even where it is performed in an emergency to save the life of the pregnant woman. We 
could choose to regard abortion as always liminal for this reason. 
 A discussion of abortion and proper medical treatment could end in either of these 
ways, and some may decide that it should. Others may be unsatisfied with an account which 
fails to take account of the diversity of abortion, however, and may consider that the fact that 
abortion is almost always safer than carrying a pregnancy to term fails to get to the heart of 
what is under discussion here. When we speak of an intervention beiQJ³WKHUDSHXWLF´LWFRXOG
be argued that there is, implicit in this description, the idea of a link between the therapeutic 
purpose and the therapeutic benefit.47 In other words, the intervention is performed in order 
to produce (or in the hope of producing) the contemplated benefit, and it is the potential for 
that benefit that contributes to the justification of the intervention (although, as I have noted 
already, some manner of patient-centred justification ± consent, best interests, or necessity ± 
must also be present). Abortion is permitted by the law in Scotland, England and Wales on 
any one or more of the following grounds:48 
 
A. that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life of the pregnant 
woman, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated;49 
B. that the termination is necessary to prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or 
mental health of the pregnant woman;50 
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 The convention of lettering the statutory grounds A-G is used by the Department of Health in England and 
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 Abortion Act 1967, s 1(1)(c). 
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 Abortion Act 1967, s 1(1)(b). 
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C. that the pregnancy has not exceeded its twenty-fourth week and that the continuance 
of the pregnancy would involve risk, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated, of 
injury to the physical and mental health of the pregnant woman;51 
D. that the pregnancy has not exceeded its twenty-fourth week and that the continuance 
of the pregnancy would involve risk, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated, of 
injury to the physical and mental health of any existing children of the family of the 
pregnant woman;52 
E. that there is substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer from such 
physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped;53 
F. that the termination is immediately necessary to save the life of the pregnant 
woman;54 and 
G. that the termination is immediately necessary to prevent grave permanent injury to the 
physical or mental health of the pregnant woman55 
 
Officially, all terminations of pregnancy are performed on one or more of the above grounds.  
While it is not impossible that fear of childbirth or of the risks associated with carrying a 
pregnancy to full term may be the reason why some women seek to terminate their 
pregnancies, there is no way of estimating how many abortions, if any, are carried out for that 
reason. Given that childbirth and abortion are both very low-risk,56 and that narratives about 
fear of childbirth do not seem to feature in explanations about why women require access to 
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safe, lawful abortion, it makes sense to assume that the vast majority of abortions are carried 
out for other reasons. ,QDQ\FDVHLIZHDFFHSWWKHDUJXPHQWWKDWµWKHUDSHXWLF¶LPSOLHVDOLQN
between therapeutic purpose and therapeutic benefit, the fact that abortion always removes 
the greater (but still slight) risk to health associated with childbirth establishes the 
SURFHGXUH¶VWKHUDSHXWLFQDWXUHonly where it is carried out for this purpose. In all other cases, 
whether abortion is therapeutic must be established and cannot simply be presumed. 
 $ERUWLRQZLOOFOHDUO\VDWLVI\WKHµWKHUDSHXWLF¶WHVWZKHUHLWLVSHUIRUPHGRQRQHRIWKH
emergency grounds (F or G). The rubrics of Grounds A, B, and C also presuppose that where 
an abortion is performed, this is in ordHUWRDYRLGDULVNWRWKHSUHJQDQWZRPDQ¶VOLIH*URXQG
A), to prevent grave permanent physical or mental harm (Ground B), or otherwise to protect 
her physical or mental health (Ground C). Where abortion is performed in order to avoid risks 
like these, its therapeutic value seems straightforward. Whether such a risk is genuinely 
present in a given case is, of course, an empirical question, and, as such, whether abortion in 
a particular case is in fact therapeutic will depend on whether there is genuinely a reasonable 
perception of the relevant risk (that is, the risk specified in the statutory ground being 
utilised) on the part of the certifying practitioner(s). In this regard, there is a particular issue 
around the interpretation and use of ground C to allow practitioners to provide abortions 
which are not genuinely therapeutic in the medical sense (discussed below). Abortions 
provided only under grounds D and E are also explicitly not therapeutic for the woman.  
Ground D refers to the risk to the existing cKLOGUHQ RI WKH SUHJQDQW ZRPDQ¶V IDPLO\ DQG
ground E to foetal abnormality. Where an abortion is performed to avoid risk to existing 
children or to terminate a pregnancy due to foetal abnormality, this cannot be construed as 
therapeutic for the pregnant woman herself, unless her own mental or physical health is 
jeopardised by these circumstances. If the latter is the case, the abortion will be justifiable not 
only under sections D or E, but also under one of the other grounds, and can be regarded as 
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therapeutic on that basis. *URXQGV'DQG(GRQRWUHIHUWRWKHZRPDQ¶VKHDOWKDQGVRGRQRW
by themselves set out any therapeutic basis for abortion. 
 Focusing on the straightforwardly therapeutic grounds A, B, F, and G for the moment, 
what proportion of all aboUWLRQLVEHLQJUHSUHVHQWHGDVµWKHUDSHXWLF¶RQRQHRIWKHVHJURXQGV" 
In Scotland, the numbers and percentages of abortions carried out under grounds A, B, F, and 
G are almost invariably suppressed µGXHWRWKHSRWHQWLDOULVNRIGLVFORVXUH¶.57 In other words, 
the numbers in these categories are so small that their publication may result in a reader being 
able to identify an individual from the statistics.58 It is impossible to know with any certainty 
the numbers and/or percentages of abortions carried out in Scotland under grounds A, B, F, 
and G, not only because the direct data on those grounds is suppressed, but also because 
certifications of abortion may cite more than one statutory ground. It is thus not possible 
simply to calculate the total numbers/percentages of abortions performed under grounds C, D, 
and E and deduct that total from the overall total in order to arrive at the combined figure for 
grounds A, B, F, and G. Nevertheless, this method can tell us the combined percentage of 
abortions carried out under grounds A, B, F, and/or G only (that is, abortions which cite one 
or more of those grounds but do not also cite grounds C, D, and/or E). It reveals that the 
percentage of abortions carried out in 2012 and 2013 which cite only grounds A, B, F, and/or 
G is under 1% (because the combined percentages for grounds C, D, and E in those two years 
total 100%), and that the percentage of abortions carried out in 2010 and 2011 which cite 
only grounds A, B, F, and/or G was 0.1% at most in each of those years. 
 Because England and Wales has a much larger population than Scotland, the risk of 
identification is lower; accordingly, the figures for England and Wales are reported. The 
reported statistics for England and Wales reveal that in 2010 µ>J@rounds A and B together 
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accounted for less than a quarter of one per cent RIDERUWLRQV¶,59 and that in each of 2011, 
  µ[g]rounds A and B together accounted for about a tenth of one per cent of 
abortions¶, that is approximately 0.1%.60 In relation to grounds F and G, the most recently 
UHSRUWHG VWDWLVWLFV QRWH WKDW µ>D@ERUWLRQV DUH UDUHO\ performed under grounds F or G. In the 
past 10 years, 4 such abortions have been performed, 1 in each of years 2006, 2011, 2012 and 
2013¶.61 
 The vast majority of lawful abortions in the UK are performed under ground C. In 
England and Wales, 98% of all abortions in 2011,62 97% of all abortions in 2012,63 and 97% 
of all abortions in 201364 ZHUHFDUULHGRXWXQGHULWDOPRVWDOZD\VXQGHULWVµULVNWRPHQWDO
KHDOWK¶DVSHFW65 99.94%,66 and 99.84%67 of ground C abortions in 2011, 2012, and 
2013, respectively). The picture in Scotland is similar; 94%,68 93%,69 and 94.5%70 of 
abortions were carried out under ground C in 2010, 2011, and 2012, respectively, with the 
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figure increasing to 98.6% in 2013.71 *URXQG & LV VRPHWLPHV UHIHUUHG WR DV WKH µVRFLDO
JURXQG¶ EHFDXVH LW LV DFNQRZOHGJHG WR EH LQWHUSUHWHG OLEHUDOO\ VR DV WR HIIHFWLYHO\ DOORZ
³abortion on demand´. Ann Furedi, Chief Executive of the British Pregnancy Advisory 
Service (BPAS), a private abortion provider, has claimed that µ[w]e all know, if we are 
honest, that ground C is a kind of code fRU³LW¶VDQXQZDQWHGSUHJQDQF\´¶.72 Furthermore: 
 
 at the moment («) women have to pretend they will have a nervous breakdown if 
they continue the pregnancy, and doctors pretend to believe them. The current 
situation makes actors of both women and doctors; it would be far better if the law 
was explicit and if women were able to obtain an abortion because the pregnancy is 
unwanted.73  
 
)XUHGL¶VRUJDQLVDWLRQLVactively campaigning for the complete decriminalisation of abortion 
and the removal of the current statutory requirements, and for abortion to be treated by the 
ODZDVDZRPHQ¶VULJKWV LVVXH UDWKHU WKDQDVDFULPLQDOPHGLFDOPDWWHU74 In the context of 
that campaign, it makes strategic sense to acknowledge that the decision to terminate a 
SUHJQDQF\RIWHQKDVQR³PHGLFDO´ basis, and that, H[FHSWLQFDVHVZKHUHDZRPDQ¶VKHDOWKLV
genuinely at risk from the continuation of her pregnancy, abortion is more accurately 
regarded as a matter of personal choice wiWKQR µWKHUDSHXWLF¶ LPSHUDWLYH Furedi highlights 
the pretence of women and their doctors around the mental health aspect of ground C in order 
to demonstrate that the 1967 Act fails to reflect modern social reality. Nowadays (the 
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argument goes)DERUWLRQLVµZLGHO\DFFHSWHGDV³SDUWRIOLIH´¶75 and understood as matter of 
personal choice, and a right. As such, the decision to terminate or continue with a pregnancy 
is properly a decision for the pregnant woman herself. If she decides that she needs an 
abortion, she should have access to it regardless of her reasons. It is highly undesirable that 
women and their doctors are forced to pretend that the reason for the termination is a ground 
C reason, and the law should change so that such pretence is no longer necessary. 
 It is not my concern here to approve or disapprove of this as a campaigning narrative; 
it is relevant to the present discussion, however, insofar as it implies that many ground C 
abortions may not be therapeutic in the sense envisaged by the 1967 Act. As Sally Sheldon 
has observed, µin the vast majority of cases («) the request for abortion is not grounded 
primarily in medical factors¶.76 Claiming that a procedure is non-therapeutic (in the medical 
VHQVH LV QRW WKH VDPH DV FODLPLQJ WKDW LW LV XQGHUWDNHQ LQ D µIULYRORXV RU XQFRQVLGHUHG¶
manner.77 Nevertheless, according to my analysis here, if a significant number of ground C 
terminations have no potential for therapeutic value (unless we take refuge in the ³abortion is 
almost always safer than childbirth´ formulation, which, I have argued, is of no assistance in 
this context), the status of these interventions as proper medical treatment must be liminal at 
best. 
 So far as ground C is concerned, each individual intervention would need to be judged 
on its merits; the above-quoted statements by Furedi and Sheldon certainly suggest that many 
ground C abortions may not be therapeutic, but the wording of the ground itself permits 
abortion only for therapeutic reasons. In contrast with this, any reference to therapeutic value 
for the patient is missing from the wordings of grounds D and E. Applying the basic typology 
of proper medical treatment that I set out in the first part of this chapter, where therapeutic 
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value is absent (as it is on a literal reading of grounds D and E, and de facto in an unknown 
number of ground C cases), an intervention may still have the status of proper treatment if it 
is clearly in the public interest to permit it. I suggested earlier that living organ donation is an 
example of treatment which is proper and permitted despite lacking therapeutic benefit for 
the patient who is the subject of the intervention. In that case, the overriding public interest 
consideration could be framed as an interest in encouraging altruism, or in addressing the 
chronic shortfall in donor organs, or both. In the abortion context, public interest 
considerations would need to be framed carefully, particularly where ground E is concerned. 
Any public interest consideration would presumably need to be constructed so as to avoid 
creating norms that discriminate against people with disabilities, or devalue their lives. The 
most likely public interest justifications in the abortion context would be ones formulated in 
terms of child welfare (grounds D and E), or in terms of respecting autonomy and choice. It 
will be for others to identify and frame the relevant justifications. My purpose here is only to 
point out that public interest or public good type justifications will be necessary. If a 
sufficient public interest justification can be made out, then even a non-therapeutic abortion 
can be proper, just as living organ donation can; although, according to my typology, it will 
be liminally so. 
 In the absence of a compelling public interest justification, non-therapeutic 
interventions cannot, I argue, be proper medical treatment. What might the implications be of 
some abortions not qualifying as proper medical treatment? First, were existing laws 
governing abortion to be repealed, surgical abortions would require the benefit of the medical 
exception, not because abortion per se is criminal, but because surgical intrusions in general 
involve a greater level of intrusion than consent alone can mitigate. One consequence of my 
argument is that if the existing statutory justification were to be removed, surgical abortions 
could only benefit from the medical exception if they could be regarded as proper medical 
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treatment. Where abortion is clearly therapeutic, and the appropriate patient-centred 
justification is present, its status as proper medical treatment is unproblematic. If the patient-
centred justification takes the form of consent, a paradigm case of proper medical treatment is 
constituted. If the patient is unconscious or lacks capacity, and the abortion is performed on 
grounds of necessity or best interests, it will, so long as it is therapeutic, be a clear case of 
proper medical treatment.  A non-therapeutic intervention upon a patient who lacks capacity 
would be improper. Where there is no potential for therapeutic benefit, however, an 
intervention can only qualify as proper medical treatment if consent and an overriding public 
interest can be established, as in the case of living organ donation.  Even then, the status of 
the treatment will be liminal at best. 
 My suggestion here, and I acknowledge that this will be controversial, is that 
abortions carried out only under grounds D and E, and those where ground C has been 
deployed in the way described by Furedi and Sheldon, can qualify as liminally proper 
treatment only if an overriding public interest justification can be identified. If no such 
MXVWLILFDWLRQ FDQ EH PDGH RXW WKH\ FDQQRW FRXQW DV µSURSHU PHGLFDO WUHDWPHQW¶ DW DOO The 
latter possibility might be viewed as an opportunity to demedicalise abortion, wresting 
control of the process away from doctors and the state, and giving it to women for the first 
time.78 In addition it could offer a solution to the issue of conscientious objection.79  But it 
also raises the possibility that if the existing statutory framework were to be removed, 
surgical abortions, lacking the benefit of the medical exception, would become vulnerable 
under the criminal law. 
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 See, e.g., JK Mason, RA McCall Smith, GT Laurie, Law and Medical Ethics (6th edn, Butterworths, 2002), 
 µD ORJLFDO FDVH FDQ EH PDGH DQG D PDMRU JURXQG IRU FRQIURQWDWLRQ WKHUHE\ UHPRYHG IRU GHOHJDWLQJ




The medical exception demarcates the boundary between the proper and the improper.  I have 
argued that on the ³proper´ side of that boundary there exists a spectrum of proper medical 
treatment, within which some treatments are more clearly proper than others. Furthermore, 
the therapeutic value or potential of treatments plays a key role in determining where we 
ought to locate them on that spectrum. Treatment that lacks therapeutic value may be 
³proper´ if consent is clearly present and an overwhelming public interest justification exists 
(as in the case of living organ donation), but it can only ever be liminally proper. It is 
certainly not paradigmatic of proper treatment, since the paradigm case of such treatment 
involves both consent and a reasonable expectation of therapeutic value. It is also too far 
away from the paradigm case to count as ³clearly´ proper.  Treatment without therapeutic 
value or potential is either liminally proper (at best) or improper, depending upon the other 
circumstances of the case. 
 Having rejected both the suggestion that all abortion is automatically therapeutic 
because birth is riskier, and the possibility that abortion can only ever be liminally proper at 
best because it always involves the destruction of human life, I have argued that whether 
abortion counts as ³proper medical treatment´ (and if so, how clearly proper it is) is 
something that can be determined only on a case-by-case basis. Nevertheless, proposals for 
decriminalising abortion completely ought to bear in mind that, at least so far as surgical 
interventions are concerned, the complete exclusion of the criminal law is impossible (given 
that all VXUJHU\ GHSHQGV XSRQ D µPHGLFDO H[FHSWLRQ¶ WR WKH FULPLQDO ODZ DQG LQWHUIHUHQFH
with the current statutory framework may, in fact, leave the practice more, rather than less, 
vulnerable. Accordingly, law reform proposals should be cognisant of the need for a 
governing statute which provides explicit authorisation for abortion. 
